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GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE CORPORATIONS IN THE 




This work proposes to examine the governance structure of public-private corporations 
that manage local utilities (water, energy and multi-utility) in Italy. The objective is  the 
verification, from a qualitative point of view, that the governance structure adequately 
guarantees the reconciliation of interests of  different categories of shareholders (public 
and private), as local public service corporations increases their own shareholding 
basis by involving financial and industrial shareholders who bring with them both 
financial and industrial interests. The work shows that the corporate governance 
structure is one important tool in the end of the public owner in order to steer and 





During the last 15 years, the public service sector in UE countries underwent enormous 
change. One of the most notable initiatives has been the externalization of public 
services through corporatization, contracting out, public and private partnership (PPP) 
and privatization of activities and entities not at the core of public administration 
(Torres and Pina, 2002; Dexia Crediop, 2004). All these initiatives are part of New 
Public Management (NPM). Definitions of NPM vary, but it often involves downsizing, 
privatisation, corporatization, competition and devolution (Hood, 1991; Walsh, 1995; 
Pollitt and Summa, 1997; Gruening, 2001; Reichard, 2002; Wollmann, 2004). 
Increasing use of market-like mechanisms and the growth of public/private partnerships 
(PPPs) of various public services in the UE, have blurred the boundaries between the 
public and private sectors (Pallot, 1999; Lane, 2000; Ryan and Ng 2000; Bovaird, 
2004). 
The Italian local utilities sector is undergoing a process of reform that is significantly 
modifying its structure and regulations of function, as well as the forms of management 
of the corporations which operate in it (Grossi and Mussari, 2004). Community 
pressure, the evolution of technologies and markets, and the general perception of 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness of public intervention are forcing two types of change:  
the progressive liberalization of the sector and the transfer of company property to 
private entities. The transformation to joint-stock companies and the gradual use of 
private capital have significantly modified the ownership of corporations in which, for 
the last century, ownership and management coincided. The opening of the ownership 
structure has required modifications in the mechanisms of corporate governance of 
public companies - the representation of new categories of shareholders. 
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This paper proposes to analyze whether, and in what measure, modifications should be 
made to the corporate governance structure of Italian local utilities corporations in order 
to guarantee the participation of different categories of shareholders (public or private). 
It will examine the structure of governance of public-private corporations that manage 
local utilities which are part of FederUtility (Italian Federation of Water, Energy and 
Other Utilities). Utilizing a formal structure, we will investigate the modalities of the 
establishment and functioning of the two principle managerial bodies, the Shareholders’ 
Assembly and the Board of Directors, verifying the existence of procedures that 
regulate the functioning of these corporate bodies. The objective is to verify, from a 
qualitative point of view, whether the structure of governance adequately guarantees 
reconciliation of the interests of the different categories of shareholders (public and 
private), as local public service corporations increase their own shareholding basis 
(which can involve shareholders with financial, as well as industrial interests). 
Examination of the corporate governance structure of these corporations could cast light 
upon a substantial disparity between the powers attributed to the public shareholder of 
control and the residual powers held by other shareholders, due to golden share 
mechanisms. 
The empirical study was conducted on a significant sample of public-private 
corporations operating in Italy, specifically, those operating in the utility sector (water, 
energy, etc.). The data was gathered through document analysis conducted on primary 
sources available at corporations and institutional bodies: Borsa Italiana SPA for listed 
corporations, Chambers of Commerce, and statutes and agreements between partners.  
To supplement the data thus gathered, a questionnaire on ownership and governance 
structure was administered to the aforementioned corporations. In order to analyze the 
procedures of governance adopted by each company, the structure of corporate 
governance was mapped, concentrating attention on two principle bodies of governance 
– the Shareholders’ Assembly and the Board of Directors. In this way, we attempted to 
reconstruct the level of representation of different categories of shareholders attributed 
to each type of corporate governance structure. Utilizing the representation level as a 
tool to measure the degree of reconciliation of corporate interests, a scale was developed 
to compare systems and identify basic, common trends. 
 
THE ADVANTAGES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
 
The development of the externalisation of public services is based on different local 
government managerial solutions (i.e. institutions, foundations, associations, 
corporations, etc.). In this article, we will focus on public-private partnerships (PPPs). 
This method has become an important development in many European countries. 
According to Bovaird (2004) public-private partnerships could be defined simply by 
“...any working arrangements based on mutual commitment (over and above that 
implied in any contract) between a public sector organization with any organization 
outside of the public sector. Consequently, they will embrace public sector partnerships 
with both business and organizations in civil society (including community 
organizations, voluntary organizations and NGOs)” (p. 200). Managers in many public 
sector areas including education, energy supply, health, and water supply are concerned 
with PPPs 
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Bovaird (2004) presents three advantages of partnerships: economies of scale, 
economies of scope, and opportunities for mutual learning between partners. In theory, 
partnerships have the potential to increase resource efficiency, making better use of 
existing resources by reducing duplication and sharing overhead. They can add value by 
bringing together complementary services and fostering innovation and synergy (i.e. 
being able to develop a product with characteristics that would not have been available 
without a PPP). Finally, partnerships enable access to new capital (Dussauge and 
Garette, 1999; Doz and Hamel, 1998).  
To explain the development of public services externalisation, several aspects must be 
taken into account:  the financial aspects, and the political aspects. First, local 
governments have the opportunity to transfer financial responsibilities to their partners, 
notably in the case of the construction of major infrastructures - thanks to the 
outsourcing of public services. Indeed, one of the explanations is the negative 
combination of increasing public funds, economic slack (faced by most of the EU 
countries at present), budget constraints, and some weak possibilities of resorting to the 
tax system. Furthermore, for a public entity, a partnership with a private entity could be 
a means to gain access to private capital for massive investment, as well as to gain 
access to the expertise of these companies. Especially in highly technological sectors, 
the know-how and control of technical constraints by private entities can be 
advantageous to local governments. For example, “the exponential rise in interest in e-
government has driven governments to work more closely with private companies in the 
ICT sector” (Bovaird, 2004, p. 201). Moreover, the outsourcing of public services can 
be a means by which local governments improve the economic efficiency of some of 
their services (i.e. when external costs are less than internal costs, or increased returns to 
scale, etc.) (Walsh, 1994). PPPs provide, in theory, a better risk allocation between 
partners. 
Secondly, the decision to externalise public services cannot be a unilateral decision 
made by politicians; user expectations and public service needs (i.e. security, quality, 
quantity) must be included in the decision making process. Externalisation should be the 
solution to reconciling the different interests of internal and external shareholders. It 
becomes necessary to link the financial aspects of outsourcing choices with a pragmatic 
vision of their consequences - for both users and politicians. The goal is the 
improvement of the quality, performance and cost of the services. Thus, it is critical that 
each partner precisely define which type of partnership he will be involved in 
(Broadbent and al. 2003, Vaillancourt Rosenau, 1999). 
There is an important diversity of meanings behind the general term PPP. As Bovaird 
(2004, p. 213) notes, “...this term differs greatly even greatly within a single country, 
never mind between countries and between public management systems and business 
systems”. Linder (1999) examines the multiple meanings that the term, public-private 
partnership assumes in contemporary discussions. Linder presents six distinctive uses of 
this term: “Each use makes a claim about what partnerships are and conveys an 
understanding of their intended purpose and significance” (p. 42). Lowndes and 
Skelcher (1998) provide arguments about the growth of multi-agency partnerships 
which confirm this typology. 
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The creation of partnerships with public entities has positive ramifications for the local 
administrative partner, particularly when it is a corporation that is active in the services 
sector. In fact, in this case, beyond the possibility of reaching an adequate remuneration 
of invested capital, the industrial partner is usually interested in developing strategies of 
alliance in order to strengthen its own market position by enlarging its user base and 
realizing processes of specialization and economies of scale. The partner rationalizes 
this use of resources in order to reach higher levels of efficiency. Through partnership 
with one or more local governments, the corporation realizes, above all, an “earning” in 
terms of social legitimacy, along with a possible improvement in its market positiono. 
In the Green Paper on public-private partnerships and community law on public 
contracts and concessions dated April 30
th
, 2004, the Commission of the European 
Communities proposed a broad definition of PPPs, as a widely-accepted definition of 
PPPs does not exist in Europe. The Commission of the European Communities states 
that “the term PPP is not defined at the Community level” (2004, p. 3). The PPPs often 
refer “to forms of cooperation between public authorities and the world of business 
which aim to ensure the funding, construction, renovation, management or maintenance 
of an infrastructure or the provision of a service” (p. 3). However, this definition covers 
a large range of possible structures. Furthermore, the definition of PPP differs 
depending upon the country, which increases the difficulty in precisely defining PPPs. 
In order to overcome these problems, the Commission makes a distinction between 
PPPs (p. 9): on one hand, “PPPs of a purely contractual nature, in which the partnership 
between the public and the private sector is based solely on contractual links”, and on 
the other hand “PPPs of an institutional nature, involving cooperation between the 
public and the private sector within a distinct entity”. This first category is close to the 
English PFI or the French delegation of public services. However, Institutionalised 
Public and Private Partnerships (IPPPs) involve the establishment of an entity held 
jointly by the public and the private partners. Local governments often utilize such 
structures to provide public services such as water, gas or energy. 
IPPPs can be seen as the most developed form of PPPs because they involve the 
creation of a separate legal entity. The development of IPPPs mainly concerns lucrative 
sectors such water or energy, as noted in France, Germany, or in Scandinavia (Greve, 
2993). They also tend to develop in new UE member states (such as Poland and 
Hungary), but also in Africa and in some American and Japanese cities. However, there 
have also been different experiences with IPPPs in non-lucrative sectors such as social, 
recreational and cultural services. The financial aspects of IPPPs cannot be the only 
reason for their establishment and development. They are also a way for politicians to 
modernize existing managerial models and to conciliate private financing and public 
expertise while keeping direct control over the execution of services. The local 
government can be the main shareholder and control the main corporate bodies (such as 
the CEO, Board of Directors and Shareholders’ meeting). 
An example of institutional partnership, the public-private corporation, is an ideal center 
for potential conflict between partners. Conflict may arise when social value – the 
satisfaction of needs in the administered community – is not adequately reconciled with 
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economic value – which should not necessarily be ascribed solely to the pursuit of 
profits. This does not mean that public and private interests are always in opposition and 
thus un-reconcilable; however, the creation of a system of governance and adequate 




CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
The concept of corporate governance is certainly broad and fragmented. It presents 
purely “practical” aspects and quite unitary theoretical dimensions. From the 
“applicative” point of view, the theme can be substantially traced back to attribution, 
within a certain corporation, of management functions (and of the connected 
responsibilities), as well as to implementation of “control” mechanisms over the activity 
of the same bodies on the part of the partners and, in different measure, of the other 
shareholders. From a theoretical standpoint, beginning in the 1990s, the same theme 
became the subject of many academic studies across multiple disciplines. The principle 
lines of research activity can be identified with reference to the functioning of stock 
markets and their impact on internal corporate management dynamics, or rather to the 
characteristics of corporate organizational structure and their effect on the “functioning” 
of the corporation. 
In particular, scientific debate on the theme of corporate governance, from an economic 
perspective, has produced numerous definitions (Monks and Minov, 1995; Tricker, 
1993; Dimsdale and Prevezer, 1994; Charkham, 1994; Lanno, 1995). These vary not 
only in relation to the theoretical basis used for framing the theme, but also in relation to 
the typology of a corporation and the geographical and cultural context of the authors 
involved. It is precisely these aspects or attitudes that define the sphere of investigation 
of a determined scientific discipline, as well as the precise category of corporation. 
Furthermore, these attitudes influence the theoretical bases for the analysis of the 
functional internal systems of a corporation, which reflect upon the current co-existence 
of diverse ideas and theories. Using the OECD definition as a starting point, it therefore 
appears possible to identify the system of corporate governance within the whole of the 
rules and procedures that discipline the functioning of the corporate bodies, delineating 
the roles inside the overall management process (from the definition of strategies and 
objectives, to the realization of the operative activity aimed at their achievement, to 
monitoring and control of the obtained results) which contribute to defining the sphere 
and breadth of the responsibilities of those who operate within the corporation as 
“interest holders” (OECD, 2004). 
To confront the theme of corporate governance in local utilities corporations, it is 
necessary, above all, to clarify the boundaries of the investigation in terms of a typology 
of corporations. Like all corporations, those which supply local public services are 
complex systems - from both an organizational and functional point of view. In fact, 
within them, still more corporate bodies operate, each dedicated to specific functions, of 
which the activity is, on the whole, aimed at the creation of shareholder value. These 
corporations need a “system of functioning” which allows them to effectively pursue 
their own missions.  The system should be defined by taking into consideration the 
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corporation’s “internal” variables (particularly its decision making processes and 
operative characteristics), as well as the effects produced by the network of 
relationships that the corporation establishes with the other bodies operating within the 
same environment; in other words, the “norms” which regulate the context of reference 
to which the corporation must conform.  
In particular, the shareholders (or “interest bearers”) must be identified, as well as those 
who bring the capital (with constraint of risk or credit) and other resources (works, 
goods and services) necessary for the realization of the production process.  
Additionally, the receivers of the output produced by the corporation, the local 
community, should also be identified. Creating value for shareholders means not only 
guaranteeing an adequate remuneration of all the factors involved in the production 
process, but also realizing, through qualitatively and quantitatively adequate services, 
satisfaction of the particular needs of the local community. In fact, the citizens claim the 
right to receive a certain level of performance from corporations, thus exercising an 
“indirect” type of control over them through the choice of the entities or individuals 
(subjects) that are called upon to cover the political duties within local governments. 
These subjects, apart from the possible involvement of local government in the capacity 
of corporate owner, must guarantee satisfaction of local community needs through tools 
that can determine the assumption of a specific role within the system of governance of 
the corporations that provide public services.  
For this reason, the relationship between the public service corporation and the 
community it supplies presents the peculiarity of involving, in the capacity of 
representative, the LG in the territory of reference. Thus, one must take into account the 
dual role assumed by public partners within the sphere of the local service corporation: 
owners of the corporation - subjects which participate more or less directly in the share 
capital of the corporate body, and guaranteed subjects – who, in the interest of the 
community, offer services according to technical, qualitative and economic standards 
which follow national and European Community regulations (Pallot, 1999). Already 
oriented to recent EU legislative changes, LGs have entrusted the production and supply 
activities of “economically relevant” public services to legally autonomous subjects.  
For this reason, preparation of these services involves many subjects, each invested with 
specific roles and among which relationships of “inter-dependence” exist. These 
relationships obviously reflect upon the internal governance structure of the corporation.  
In general, with particular reference to the factors which influence this structure, it is 
possible to identify some characteristics of “rigidity”: 
•  the modality of entrustment of legal ownership of the services prescribed by 
the national normative (public tender or direct assignment, according to the 
typology of the subject which is entrusted with the production of the services), 
•  the ownership structure of the public service corporation over which the LG is 
able to exercise control, 
•  the definition of the normative instruments of regulation of the relationships 
between the public service corporation and the LG (service contract), or rather 
the national discipline on the theme of corporate bodies, with particular 
reference to the norms relative to the models of administration and control 
(typology, functions and responsibility of the corporate bodies) to be applied 
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whenever the public service corporation is organized in the legal form of a 
joint-stock company. 
Nevertheless, different areas of autonomy also exist. There is the possibility to define - 
through autonomous choices - the contents, characteristics and intensity of the 
relationships between LGs and public service corporations. In particular, we refer to the 
choice relative to the type of subject (corporation 100% publicly-owned or public-
private corporation) to which responsibility for production and supply of services will 
be transferred. This choice is derived from consideration of both the economic and 
political character of the entity’s corporate management connection, relative to the LG’s 
degree of suitable direct legal involvement.  Also considered are the possible forms of 
involvement of the private sector that the LG intends to promote. In particular, 
whenever the corporate connection of the corporation involves subjects with 
differentiated interests, it is necessary to achieve an adequate balance of power, which is 
immediately reflected in the governance structure of the corporation. For example, 
statute provisions or contract stipulations, which have as their objective the modality of 
appointment of the corporate bodies (particularly the administrative body), specify the 
breadth of the proxies conferrable to one or more administrators, as well as the 
modalities and mechanisms of control on the part of the partners in relationship to  
accomplishment of particular operations such as right of veto or the expression of 
opinions of acceptance (in the case of determined management choices). 
In 2003, new measures related to the planning of corporate governance in public service 
corporations were introduced. Additionally, Italian joint-stock companies’ corporate 
rights were reformed. Both occurrences impacted the choice of legal structure of the 
administrative and control systems to be adopted. Since both the functions attributed to 
the social bodies, as well as the mechanisms for exercising the activity of control over 
their operation differ, the adoption of the traditional model rather than the dualistic or 
monistic one is directly translated into the structure regulating the relationship between 
social bodies and partners. 
 
ITALIAN EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
The investigative sample  
The empirical investigation of local public service corporations’ systems of governance 
operating in Italy was conducted with specific reference to the corporations associated 
with FederUtility - the Italian Federation of Corporations operating in the sector of 
water and energy supply founded in 2005 by the “fusion” of two associations, 
Federenergia and Federgasacqua. The considered corporations are classified by 
FederUtility among 295 corporations associated with FederUtility. 
Sixty-four corporations (approximately 22% of the corporations associated with 
FederUtility) were public-private corporations. Of the 64 corporations contacted, 45 
corporations (approximately 70% of the total number of effectively mixed corporations) 
were included in the study. In some cases (approximately 30% of the cases), the 
participation of local governments in social capital is higher than 99% and the 19 
corporations were excluded from the study. When present and possible to acquire, we 
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analyzed the Statutes and Agreements between partners. With these documents, it was 
possible to identify - beyond the characteristics of the administrative and control 
systems related to the functions of the corporate bodies - the modalities of regulation of 
relationships between public-private partners.  
The predominant legal form of the corporations in the sample is that of joint-stock 
companies (43 out of 45 corporations). The corporations were located mainly in north–
central Italy (in particular, Tuscany, Lombardy, Piemonte and Emilia Romagna). 
Homogeneous characteristics were identified which allowed us to group the 
corporations based on typology of the entities involved in the corporate partnership: 
• 9 corporations in the sample are listed on the stock exchange and carry out the 
role of parent company in a large-sized corporate aggregation specializing in the 
management of local public services; 
• 25 corporations are associated with, to varying degrees, at least one of the listed 
corporations just identified and are included in the consolidated report of the 
parent company; 
• in 6 other cases, the partnership involves different listed corporations from the 9 
public service corporations included in the sample, or rather corporations that 
are not quoted but that are, however, part of the corporate group; 
• the remaining 5 corporations are associated with corporate bodies that are not 
involved in group structures, rather they are associated solely via a position or 
an individual. 
In some cases, the transformation of corporate bodies of public capital was followed by 
merger processes among corporations operating in the local public services sector. In 
others (24%), the companies were constituted ex-novo into the form of mixed capital 
corporations. In most cases (73%), the corporations considered in the study assumed 
their current public-private corporation configuration after transformation processes of 
already existing 100% publicly-owned corporations. In few cases (4%), the corporations 
considered their current configuration after transformation processes of already existing 
100% private-owned corporations.  
Ownership structures and relationships between partners 
Analysis of the equity composition of public-private corporations was carried out for 
“homogeneous” groups of companies, based on typology of the entities involved in the 
corporate partnership. 
Regarding the 9 corporations listed on the Stock Exchange, the average participation of 
LGs is approximately 59% of the equity; in some cases this participation is held 
indirectly, through corporations controlled by LGs. Shareholders with large holdings 
(other than LGs) have on average about 3% of the equity.  Corporate statutes impose 
maximum shareholding limits for all entities different from local governments or other 
types of publicly-controlled entities. The average value of the quota of floating capital 
on the market is equal to around 35% of total capital.  In only one case did the local 
government hold an overall amount of less than 50% of the capital. 
Regarding the 25 corporations in the sample participated in by at least one of the nine 
previously considered listed companies, a first analysis showed that on average 51% of 
the capital was directly controlled by LGs. In particular in 7 corporations the quota held 
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directly by LGs was lower than 40%. However, a deeper analysis of the “indirect” quota 
of public capital - the part of the capital which is in the hands of legally private 
corporations (specifically this deals with 9 quoted corporations operating in the sector 
of local public services) - shows that the LGs are, in reality, in charge of this capital, 
thus substantially increasing the quota of capital in the hands of LGs from 51% to 75%. 
Regarding the composition of the share equity in the case of the remaining corporations 
(11), the quota of equity owned by local governments is, on average, equal to 58%. 
On average, more than 60% of the equity of corporations in the sample is held by local 
governments in a direct way - through corporations that are controlled or participated in 
by consortiums of LGs or bodies representing the Local Governments (Mountain 
Communities, Territorial Area Authorities). In particular, the participation of local 
governments was less than 50% in only 7% of the cases and in 44% of the corporations 
in the sample the quota of capital in the hands of the Municipalities (directly or 
indirectly) was over 75%. 
Furthermore, in around 29% of the corporations, public ownership of capital is 
“concentrated” in the hands of a single local government (13 corporations, of which 4 
are quoted). However, in cases where the “public” quota of capital was held by multiple 
individual subjects (in some cases, a very large number), there were generally more 
localized Municipalities in the same Province or in more territorially contiguous 
Provinces.  In most cases, an LG for the Province (usually the head Municipality, but in 
some cases also the provincial administration, the Territorial Area Authorities or other 
associative institutions) held the higher quota of capital in relation to that held by the 
other smaller public institutions. This LG exercises, on behalf of a part or all, the 
function of representation in the assembly. 
The previous ownership structure is substantially derived from statute norms. 
Approximately 64% of the examined statutes bind, in favor of LGs, ownership of the 
majority shares of equity. In 7 cases the statute clearly identifies a single LG which, for 
the life of the corporation, must be guaranteed possession of at least 50% of the social 
capital. In the other cases, the reserve is, in general, managed by the LGs, often with 
specific reference to the possibility to hold quotas of capital indirectly through 
corporations (also consortiums) that are held or controlled. The responsibility of 
monitoring is usually attributed to the Board of Directors in order that the statute norms 
which bind the holding of the majority of equity on the part of the LGs are respected for 
the life of the corporation, with particular reference to the operations of transfer and 
ending of shareholding on the part of partners or in the case of increase in equity. 
With particular reference to the relationship between partners, the desire to guarantee 
stability to the shareholding structure seems to be common and diffused; the 
instruments available can be traced back to the following Statute provisions:   
• stock rights, in case of an increase in equity; 
• drawing rights, in case of transfer or ending of a shareholding; 
• approval of sale clauses, expressly provided in the case of entry of new partners. 
Partner stock rights are recognized in article 2441 of the Civil Code (and cited expressly 
in 47% of the Statutes) in proportion to the quota of equity held at the moment in which 
the increase in equity is carried out. In the case of transfer or cession of a part of or all 
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of the holdings by one or more partners, drawing rights are guaranteed for the other 
partners. The possibility to underwrite the quota of a shareholder packet “on sale” is 
guaranteed, in proportion to their own holdings, as noted in 51% of the corporations. In 
cases where option rights are not exercised for the whole amount of the ceded shares, 
only some Statutes recognize the possibility to sell the rest to third parties, providing 
instead to recognize (for the subject proposing the sale) the possibility of withdrawing 
from the corporation. About half of the Statutes (47%) provide for approval of sale 
regarding the entrance of new subjects into the corporate structure. In particular, the 
directors are called upon to verify the possession (on the part of the buyer), the technical 
requirements, and the financial capacity necessary for guaranteeing achievement of the 
social objective. 
The relationship between partners is further specified in partner contracts, which were 
underwritten by at least 20 corporations in the sample (44%), among which two are 
listed corporations. Data gathered shows that subjects involved in the stipulation of 
Contracts are in some cases public partners, in others public/private partners. Recourse 
to the contract instrument on the part of private partners, in the case of participation in 
capital of the same corporation, was rarer. In most cases, partner contracts include 
clauses for the attribution and designation of power, as well as for appointment of 
executive body members. Often, the private partner is assigned the designation of Chief 
Executive Office (CEO), although in some cases an expression of acceptance on the part 
of the public partner is necessary.  Furthermore, none of the mechanisms for election of 
corporate bodies provide for the possibility of making a direct appointment.  The 
partner contracts contain clauses that establish the number of administrators to be 
designated by each partner. In other cases, when the Contract involves subjects of the 
same “category” (only public partners or only private partners), it is essentially voting 
trust (or an agreement on how they will vote) that binds the parties at the Shareholders’ 
Assembly.   Their position is planned and a unitary (unified) vote expressed via 
delegation of the vote to a single subject. In some cases, the Contracts attribute to the 
industrial partner a drawing right, for example in cases of assignment of services or 
work orders on the part of the public partners. Finally, contractual clauses relative to 
agreements connected to the dividends or tariffs can be present. 
Choice of partner and services managed  
In more than half of the corporations (64%), the partner was chosen through a public 
tender; nevertheless, the data was calculated on 70% of the corporations participating in 
the investigation. Generally, the motivation for this choice can be traced back to the fact 
that national regulations currently in effect allow corporations which select a private 
partner via the competitive process to obtain direct assignment by Local Government 
partners, in relation to the activity of supplying services to the user. This partner 
selection method allows for the creation of situations of competition between the 
subjects involved and the entrance of equity.  This is especially relevant in cases where 
participation (in the corporate structure) of multiple LG entities is necessary in order to 
acquire technical and management skills relative to the entrepreneurial production of 
services. In fact, the competitive procedure, at least in theory, guarantees the possibility 
of “taking in to account the most economically advantageous offer” in realizing the 
“services to be supplied”.  
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Regarding the typology of partners, the empirical data shows how, in reference to the 
totality of the corporations in the sample:  
• 67% of the corporations have, among their partners, businesses operating in the  
local public service sector; 
• 31% of the corporations have, among their partners, businesses of a different 
type with respect to those above; 
• 22% of the corporations have, among their partners, banks; 
• 22% have made recourse to the public company; 
• 13% of the corporations are participated in by other subjects that cannot be 
traced back to the preceding “categories”. 
Furthermore, in about half of the corporations in the sample (47%), the corporate 
partnership involves a single “private” subject. In particular, the data also includes cases 
in which the corporation is has joint participated in and by other corporations made up 
of many subjects, or by regroupings of many businesses that exercise their rights 
derived from joint participation. 
Regarding the typology of services managed, more than 80% of corporations in the 
sample are multi-utility businesses, operating contemporaneously in many public 
services. Usually, however, a part of the activity is entrusted to operative structures 
controlled and connected to the considered corporations. 
In particular: 
• approximately 71% of corporations in the sample operate in the water sector; 
• 22% manage the networks for the distribution of gas; 
• 13% manage the networks relative to the distribution of electrical energy; 
• 27% distribute gas; 
• 15% distribute electrical energy; 
• 64% of corporations in the sample also operate in other sectors of local public 
services. In some cases, these are services which are connected with previously 
considered services (i.e. water distribution, when this activity is not carried out 
in a manner that is integrated with the other phases provided for by regulations 
of the water cycle, production of electrical energy and heat management). In 
other cases there are differentiated services: environmental service and the waste 
cycle (particularly urban and environmental hygiene), transportation, 
pharmacies, public lighting, traffic lights and cemetery services. Finally, some 
businesses also operate in “specialized” services, such as district heating, 
management of optic fibre networks/telephone communications, and 
management of alternative energy sources and informative systems. 
 
Models of corporate governance and the composition of the corporate bodies  
Ninety-one percent of the corporations in the sample are joint-stock companies which 
have adopted traditional (“latin”) governance systems that provide for the subdivision of 
duties (in some cases, with functions of accounting control) among three corporate 
bodies: the Shareholders’ Assembly, the Board of Directors and the Board of Auditors. 
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Approximately 18% of the Statutes analyzed contain a listing of matters specially 
attributed to the Shareholders’ Assembly’s sphere of power. This attribution of matters 
(beyond those in the Civil Code) can essentially be traced back to the approval of multi-
year plans for the determination of management direction, the approval of financial 
operations, the ratification of stipulation of joint-ventures or agreements between the 
corporation and other subjects, and the cessation or acquisition of shares in other 
corporations. Furthermore, in several cases, the Statutes provide qualified majorities for 
validation of assembly deliberations, in cases of both ordinary and special assemblies. 
In particular, around 29% of the Statutes analyzed provided increased majorities for at 
least some matters under the power of the Ordinary Assembly, particularly approval of 
strategic planning and development programs, cession of owned assets beyond a certain 
amount, or the cession of a branch of the corporation. Regarding the Special Assembly, 
44% of the Statutes provided for stronger majorities for operations concerning an 
increase in social capital, for early dissolution of the corporation, for modifications to 
the corporate mission, for merger or division and, in some cases, for modifications 
relative to the attribution of voting rights and issuing of corporate bonds or shares with 
particular privileges. 
The analysis of the Statute clauses relative to the composition and functioning of the 
Board of Directors was conducted in reference to the following points:   
• number of components of the executive body; 
• attribution of powers of direct appointment by LG partners; 
• presence of limits to the assignment of proxies by administrators; 
• previsions of a qualified majority for the deliberation of particular matters. 
Approximately 36% of the Statutes place a limit on the Board of Directors (between 3 
to 14 administrators). In other cases, the statute regulations set a minimum and 
maximum number of administrators, delegating the Shareholders’ Assembly to 
establish, each time, the numerical composition of the executive body.  In these cases, 
there is the possibility of delegating the entire activity to one administrator, up to a 
maximum of 15 members. 
The statutory attribution of direct powers of nomination of members of the Board of 
Directors to LG partners characterized 44% of the corporations in the sample. In 
particular, in 10 corporations (equal to about 22% of the sample) the power of direct 
nomination applies to the majority of the members of the executive body. In some cases 
this power was attributed in proportion to the quota of underwritten equity. 
The mechanism of list voting, used for the nomination of members of the Board of 
Administration of assembly authority, in some cases presented “peculiarities”: 
• in several Statutes (and, in some cases, in the Contracts between partners) 
clauses are present which determine the number of administrators elected for 
each list, setting aside the number of votes effectively obtained in the assembly 
meeting; 
• in some cases, local government partners are obligated by statute regulations (or 
contracts) to present a single list.  
In reference to the statute norms which regulate the functioning of the administrative 
body, around 67% of the Charters contain special clauses which exclude the possibility 
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of attributing proxies on the part of the administrators in reference to determined 
matters, beyond that which is established by law. In particular, this regards the 
deliberations of the approval of annual and multi-year financial plans of management 
and investment (and their modifications), the decisions relative to the size of the 
company staff and actions in matters of occupational policies (plans for hiring 
personnel), the proposals of modifications of the Statute to be presented to the 
Shareholders’ Assembly, the approval and modification of possible internal regulations 
and the nomination of the representatives of the corporation and of the companies held 
(when this authority is not attributed to the Shareholders’ Assembly). 
Usually, for these matters, as well as for deliberations essentially regarding the 
nomination and assignment of powers to the CEO or the attribution of particular duties 
to other administrators or to the top management, the favorable vote of a qualified 
(strong) majority of the members of the Board of Directors is required. In fact, in most 
cases, in reference to the acts of “ordinary administration” the Board is validly made up 
of the presence of the majority of the members and deliberates with the favorable vote 
of the majority of those present. 
In some cases, the Statutes (or the Contracts between partners) assign the designation of 
CEO to the “private” partners, expressly excluding the possibility that this subject 
should be chosen on the designation of the local government partners. With reference to 
the powers attributed to the CEO, most of the Statutes do not contain the special listing, 
deferring all matters that can be delegated to the Board of Directors.  In some cases, 
however, the matters are specified in the public-private partner contracts. 
Finally, regarding the Board of Auditors, the mechanism of nomination is almost 
always traceable back to that established for the Board of Administration. In 35.5% of 
cases, the power of direct nomination of at least two members is attributed to the public 
partners. In particular, in 5 corporations the Board of Auditors also carries out the 
function of accounting control. 
Only two corporations in the sample have adopted the dualistic (“german”) system of 
governance, characterized by the presence (beyond the Shareholders’ Assembly) of a 
Management Board and a Surveillance/Supervision Board. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
During the past ten years the number of joint-stock companies operating in Italy in the 
sector of local utilities has increased a great deal. The legislative choices operating in 
matters of the modality of management of local public services and the expectations to 
be reached of the same operators, through private models that are slender and 
characterized by legal and managerial autonomy, higher efficiency and economy in the 
supply of services have weighed upon this direction in a determining manner. Against 
the success of the so-called “corporatization” (Reichard, 2002), however, the local 
governments continue to be, in most cases, the main owners. The realization of 
partnerships with private providers has been implemented in limited areas of public 
services delivery and most notably at the local level. 
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The analysis conducted on public-private corporations currently operating in Italy 
shows how each corporation is characterized by its own corporate governance system, 
prevalently modelled according to the traditional structure of administration and control. 
However, the division of authority between corporate bodies and the mechanisms of 
control over their operation vary according to the “context”.  
One of the determining factors, governance system planning, can be traced back to the 
typology of partners involved with local government in the public service sector. In 
particular, the practice of attributing some powers to the industrial partner via statutes or 
partner agreement stipulations seems to be diffused specifically the choice of the 
managing director and the definition of his authority. In some cases this occurs at the 
time of establishment of the corporate body or, more frequently, at the time in which the 
social structure of the ex-municipalized or special company is enlarged and diversified 
via entrance of different partners from local governments. At the same time, however, a 
combination of other factors distinguishes the position of the industrial partner from that 
of other partners (i.e. forecasting of additional performance connected to the technical 
activity of production and supply of services and limited to the free transfer of share 
quotas). On the other hand, the position of public partner appears to almost always be 
characterized by the attribution of specific powers (direct nomination, expression of 
opinions of approval and in some cases true veto powers) which further define the 
recognition of a different “weight” within the social structure. 
Within this articulated system of actors (public and private) the fundamental point 
appears to be the relationship between the local government and corporations. The local 
government must be able to balance opposite needs: to increase the autonomy and the 
growth and development of the corporation, while promoting harmonisation and 
integration of a well-defined network strategy (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997).  
We may conclude that the term public and private partnership has different meanings 
and is characterized by diverse institutional models, but they can be considered as 
alternative to direct provision or contracting out. After the analysis of the characteristics 
of the institutional public and private partnerships in the Italian context, we realized that 
the corporate governance is one important tool in the hand of the public owner in order 
to steer and control the public and private corporations (Hughes, 1994; Walsh, 1994; 
Pallot, 1999; Neale and Anderson, 2000).  
Corporate governance can be carried out with the following instruments: 
• The definition of the quantity and the mix of endowment capital, deciding, 
therefore, not only the overall value of resources transferred to the corporation, 
but also the typology of choice, distinguishing between tangible assets or 
financial assets; 
• Identification of the possible partners (public and/or private) with whom to share 
the corporate structure; 
• Definition of the corporate statute, with which they can define the sphere of 
action of the corporation (objective) from the point of view of the range of 
services carried out, the territorial sphere of operation (local/regional/national), 
and the choice of the most suitable corporate governance model for shaping its 
corporate bodies in terms of powers and modality of nomination; 
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• Underwriting of agreement between the public and/or private partners in order to 
identify the obligations imposed by the controlled corporation (for example, in 
matters of inter-institutional reporting and the periods of time for transmitting 
information). 
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4) Models of corporate governance and corporate bodies 
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